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assumed to be universal. To examine how cultural background informs economic
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in a cross-cultural study, the authors conducted an experiment in the United States
and China. The experiment was designed to test cultural and cognitive effects on a
fundamental economic phenomenon-- how people estimate the financial values of
objects over time.
Results of the experiment demonstrated dramatic cultural differences in
financial value estimations, as well as on the influence of variables such as
framing effects. Chinese participants made higher object value estimates than
Americans did, even when adjusting for differing national inflation rates. In
addition, the results showed that contextual information, such as framing, morality
information, and group membership affected judgments of financial values in
complex ways, particularly for Chinese participants. The results underscore the
importance of understanding the influence of cultural background on economic
decision-making. The authors discuss the results in the context of behavioral law
and economics, and propose that importing cultural competence into behavioral
models can lead to cognitive debiasing, both temporary and permanent.
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INTRODUCTION
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that all people, across nations,
cultures, and backgrounds make economic judgments in essentially the same
way. In the past three decades, psychological and behavioral economic
research ha ve demonstrated that people depart quite frequently and
systematically from the neoclassical economic model. 1 This behavioral
critique of rational economic choice has been embraced by many disciplines,
including by scholars in the field of behavioral law and economics. 2 Even with
the prospering of the behavioral critique of rational economics, however, most
researchers (including those advocating for an accurate behavioral model) still
adhere to universalistic assumptions. That is, they assume that if a cognitive
bias or heuristic will cause deviation from rational economic decision-making,
all people will be susceptible to that bias and deviate in their decision-making.
As a result, the potential that cultural differences systematically influence
economic decision-making has generally been overlooked by economists and
behavioralists alike.3
1

See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). See also George Loewenstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP . 181 (1989); RICHARD E.
NISBETT & LEE D. ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE : STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT (1980).
2
See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN . L. REV. 1471 (1998). See also Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Ex Post Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
89 (1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal
Analysis, 97 NW . U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
3
Although most scholars continue to overlook cultural differences in their behavioral
assumptions, a few have called attention to systematic cultural differences in a variety of
behavioral assumptions. Projects that linked culture to behavioral economics have
included those by Licht and Mitchell. See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of all Path
Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26
DEL. J. CORP . L. 147 (2001); Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, CrossListing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. OF INT ’L L. 195 (2004);
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Gregory
Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, 2003 M ICH. ST . L. REV. 1065. See also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 CHI. L. REV. 207
(2006); Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on
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If culture systematically affects economic decision-making, behavioral
and financial models should adjust to recognize the importance of culture.
Making such an adjustment requires not just treating cultural differences as
simple triggers of individual differences 4 or as biases themselves to be removed
through a problem-solution debiasing framework.5 Instead, incorporating
cultural knowledge requires that culture be recognized both as a cause of
diverse decision-making and as a prescriptive tool that can help facilitate
behavioral predictions and legal reform efforts. Along these prescriptive lines,
consider a biological analogy-- scientists have unearthed new potential cures
for disease simply by investigating biological and genetic diversity across
cultural groups.6 These studies have shown that elements of diversity may
contain clues that can be used to understand vulnerabilities in some groups.7
Exploring the cultural foundations of fundamental economic decision- making
may similarly reveal clues that would assist both economic and financial
modeling, as well as debiasing efforts.
This Article critiques a behavioral economics field that has traditionally
ignored cultural variation, and argues that cross-cultural learning can teach us
not only how to avoid cognitive biases, but also how to build accurate legal and
behavioral models. We make two primary claims. First, we argue that
behavioral models should recognize the systematic influence of culture on
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006). Kahan and his colleagues’ model brings a focus on
cultural preferences to decision-making theory. We believe, however, that the cultural
preferences discussed by Kahan and his colleagues are distinguishable from the crosscultural influences on thought that we describe. See infra note [77]. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006).
4
Some recent scholarship in behavioral law and economics recognizes that individual
differences play a role in bias susceptibility. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein,
Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006). Though they do not specifically
discuss cultural differences, Jolls and Sunstein do address how individuals with different
bias susceptibilities would be affected by their model.
5
Debiasing literature has not suggested that culture may contain debiasing clues. See,
e.g. Boris Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1982). For a thorough discussion of debiasing in the
law, see Jolls & Sunstein, supra note __ (arguing for debiasing through changes to
substantive law). Existing models of debiasing generally make the same universalistic
assumptions as behavioral economics.
6
See David B. Goldstein & Gianpiero L. Cavalleri, Understanding Human Diversity,
437 NATURE , October 27, 2005, at 1241 (discussing how gene variants may be used to
better understand potential cures for genetically influenced diseases). Also relevant to
discussions of diversity and biological solutions is research indicating that biological
diversity may serve to reduce risks of disease. See, e.g. Biodiversity May Reduce Lyme
Disease,
SCIENCE
DAILY,
June
8,
2000,
available
at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2000/06/000608074403.htm (last visited, April 20,
2006).
7
Id.
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economic decision-making. Second, we propose that cultural knowledge
should be an integral part of debiasing solutions. To make these claims, it is
first necessary to illustrate that culture does in fact influence economic
decisions. We pursued this challenge by employing an empirical study across
cultures that tested both financial value estimations and contextual variables
common to social psychological discourse. We specifically chose to test
financial estimations 8 because of their fundamental importance to economic
analysis. Our results indicate not only that economic decision- making varies
systematically across cultures, but also that members of different cultures react
to situational variables in divergent ways.9
We have organized this Article as follows: In Section II, we review the
importance of econo mic decision-making in today’s financial and legal worlds,
and situate this importance against a backdrop of globalization with an Asia
focus. After establishing the practical economic and theoretical reasons for
studying economic decision- making across cultures, we detail the social and
cognitive bases of our claims, relying primarily on cultural psychological
theory. Cultural psychology has theoretically, and in some cases explicitly,
given us reason to think that cultural competency is integral to beha vioral
models. We then review existing behavioral economic and legal discourse.
We point out that although cultural psychology has recently been recognized in
a few discussions of legal policy, most scholarship continues to overlook its
powerful influences. Furthermore, scholarship in debiasing also overlooks
culture as a potential solution tool.
In Section III, we detail our empirical project, from predictions to
results. To test our theory that culture influences economic decision- making in
a variety of systematic ways, we conducted an empirical investigation of
financial value estimations across cultures, and examined how these
estimations might be susceptible to a variety of contextual factors. Our results
indicate that Americans and Chinese make vastly different fundamental
economic assumptions in making financial value estimations. In addition, the
results show that contextual variables (such as framing) have different effects
based on the participant’s culture. These results reinforce the conc lusion that
culture is an important factor in decision-making. Section IV connects the
8

As will become clear in our empirical study, infra Section III, when we refer to
“financial estimations” we are referring to laypersons’ judgments of the actual value of a
given object (such as a gold ring). Note that this focus on financial estimations varies
slightly with behavioral economic studies that focus more on the utility of an object’s value
than on the actual value itself. We chose to test financial estimations rather than utility
judgments because we believed that value estimations are more fundamental economic
judgments, and we desired to begin our empirical investigation by looking at the most
fundamental economic measures.
9
In addition to our empirical study, we discuss existing cross-cultural research on
cognitive biases, infra Section II C.
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study’s results to behavioral economic and legal discourse, and proposes that
culture should be incorporated into economic decision-making models. If
economic decision-making (and cognitive biases) vary systematically across
cultures, then behavioral economic models must either incorporate cultural
variables or specifically acknowledge the cultural limitations of those models.
Section V proposes the concept of debiasing through cultural competency. We
suggest two ways in which cultural competency can help us better understand
and solve deviations from rational economic thought: through cultural training
and through model building. Section VI offers some concluding thoughts.
II. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN A DIVERSE AND INTERCONNECTED WORLD
A. Global Economic Development and Financial Judgments
Understanding the essence of how people make financial judgments
has worldwide significance. For centuries economists, businesspeople,
politicians, and scholars have relied on economic and financial assumptions
when generating theory, crafting laws and developing policy. 10 Only in the
past few decades, however, have psychologists discovered the roles of
cognitive forces in economic decision-making. 11 These discoveries, embodied
by the fields of behavioral economics and behavioral finance, 12 added a human
component to models of economic decision-making at a time when the world’s
business marketplace was rapidly becoming globally interconnected and
diverse.13 In the years since Kahneman and Tversky unveiled their early
findings, 14 behavioral economics has prospered and the world’s economy has
continued to diversify, with eyes shifting east to China, an emerging economic
10

See, e.g., A DAM SMITH, A N INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
W EALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
11
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note [1]; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On
the Psychology of Prediction. 80 PSYCHOL. REV. 237 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI . 1124 (1974).
12
In this Article, we focus primarily on behavioral economic claims. However, we
believe that our claims, and in particular our empirical study’s results, apply to behavioral
finance as well. For more on behavioral finance, see, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 W ASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002);
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1400 (2001); Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN . L. RE V. 1 (2003).
13
See SMART GLOBALIZATION: DESIGNING GLOBAL STRATEGIES, CREATING GLOBAL
NETWORKS (Anil K. Gupta & D. Eleanor Westney, eds., 2003); Theodore Levitt, The
Globalization of Markets, HARVARD BUS. REV., May 01, 1983 (providing a provocative
perspective on globalization). See also Nanette S. Levinson & Minoru Asahi, CrossNational Strategic Alliances and Interorganizational Learning, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL
DYNAMICS 50 (1995)
14
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note [1]; Kahneman & Tversky, supra note [11];
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note [11].
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force.15 Yet, despite the simultaneous emergence of behavioral economics and
economic globalization with an East Asian focus, economists, psychologists,
and legal scholars have only begun to explore how cultural forces affect
financial decision- making in systematic and predictable ways. Such an
exploration reveals not only that people make economic judgments and
financial estimations in systematically different ways across cultural groups,
but also that understanding cultural differences themselves may help debiasing
efforts.
B. Cognitive Deviations from Economic Rationality
The history of behavioral economics has illuminated fascinating
deviations from utility theory, but its theories are rarely tested in a crosscultural setting.
Notwithstanding its culturally universal assumptions,
“prospect theory” has been widely accepted as a behavioral-based alternative to
expected utility theory. 16 Prospect theory, and behavioral economics more
generally, explain why decision-makers systematically deviate from
economically rational models. 17 For example, the endowment effect illustrates
that the perceived value of an object increases when a person owns it.18
Tversky and Kahneman also found that losses are considered by people to be
more important than equivalent gains.19 They explained that losses loom
bigger than gains psychologically because they seem more powerful, more
likely to take place, and appear more significant in affecting the future. 20
Another economic bias, the money illusion effect, shows that people
tend to focus more on nominal values than real values. 21 For instance, people
15

See, e.g. CHINA ’S CENTURY: THE A WAKENING OF THE NEXT ECONOMIC
POWERHOUSE (Laurence J. Brahm ed., 2001); ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY :
THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE
OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (2005); James Kynge, A Tireless Powerhouse in the Region:
Trade in China, FIN. TIMES (U.K. ed.), Oct. 16, 2001; China, Coming Out, THE
ECONOMIST , Mar. 23, 2006.
16
See, e.g. REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN
W ORLD (2001); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (C. Sunstein, ed. 2000); Chris
Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW . U. L. REV. 1115 (2003).
17
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note __. See also Jolls et al, supra note __.
18
Kahneman & Tversky, supra note __. See also Korobkin, supra note __; Jennifer
Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD . 1 (2002).
19

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and The Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCI . 453 (1981).
20
Id. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for
Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 627 (1996).
21
See Eldar Shafir et al., Money Illusion, 112 Q. J. ECON. 341 (1997). See also
Michael Pereira, Risk Management for the Age of Information, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP . FIN. L.
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react more favorably to a 2% salary raise in times of 4% inflation than to a 2%
salary cut in times of no inflation, even when they are aware of all relevant
information. A study of this effect was conducted by Raghubir and
Srivastava, 22 who tested how people understand and mentally calculate the
economic basis of currency exchange and value.23 They found that, consistent
with the money illusion effect, people’s spending behavior is a function of the
relationship between the face value (nominal value) of the foreign currency and
their home currency. This is true, they hypothesized, because an individual
forms an initial judgment by anchoring on a more salient and easy to use
attribute, such as the face value of the currency, and then adjusts that initial
judgment to reflect other remaining attributes. 24
Legal scholars have done well to incorporate a vast array of
psychological factors into legal fields that are heavily influenced by economic
models.25 These proponents of behavioral economics have recognized that
neoclassical economic models of legal efficiency fail to accurately predict
human behavior.26 As a result, over the past decade, commentators have
critiqued a wide spectrum of legal rules. 27 This work has had a broad impact
on legal scholarship. 28 Influential works have emerged from some of the
nation’s top legal minds, including in the areas of contract law 29 , tort law30 ,
715 (2003) (reviewing ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 21ST
CENTURY (2003)).
22
Priya Raghubir & Joydeep Srivastava, Effect of Face Value on Monetary Valuation
in Foreign Currences, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 335 (2002).
23
Id.
24
Id. See also Brian Wansink et al., An Anchoring and Adjustment Model of Purchase
Quantity Decisions, 35 J. M ARKETING RES. 71 (1998).
25
See Jolls et al, supra note __; BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note __.
26
See id. See also Donald Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Dan
Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 511 (2004).
27
See Langevoort, supra note __.
28
See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 115 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. RE V.
1051 (2000).
29
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN . L. REV. 211 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default
Rules, 83 CORNELL L. RE V. 608 (1998); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Oren Bar-Gill &
Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an ‘Irrational’ Breach of Contract, 11 SUP . CT. ECON.
REV. 143 (2004); Christine Jolls , Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD . 203 (1997); Linda Babcock et al., Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 A M. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995); Linda Babcock &
Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, 28 J. LEGAL STUD .
341 (1999).
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property law31 , criminal law 32 , corporate and securities law 33 , discrimination
law34 , and punitive damages 35 , among others. These works typically critique a
substantive legal area’s economic assumptions by describing a more accurate
understanding of human behavior. Other influential works begin not with a
broad legal area but with a cognitive bias, and work from there, pointing out its
influence on either a specific topic or a range of legal topics. These works have
30

See Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications
for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP . CT . ECON. RE V. 125 (2004); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 NYU.
L. RE V. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999); Jon D. Hanson
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market
Manipulation, 6 ROGER W ILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000).
31
See Jeffrey Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice
between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from
Behavioral Studies, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 219 (2001); Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar,
Incentives to Create Under a "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons from a
Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437
(2002)(focusing on intellectual property analysis).
32
See Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics:
Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 A M. L. & ECON.
REV. 276 (1999); Ehud Guttel, Overcorrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 241 (2004); Tom Baker et al.,
The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. RE V. 443
(2004).
33
See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. RE V. 581 (2002);
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PENN. L. RE V.
101 (1997); Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1459 (2005);
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink , 71 U. CIN L. RE V.
1233 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO L. J. 797
(2001); Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge &
G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does Boundedly): Rules of Thumb In Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83 (2002);
Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 NW . U. L. REV. 133 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard,
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN . L. REV. 1 (2003).
34
See Cass Sunstein & Christine Jolls, The Law of Implicit Bias, (unpublished
manuscript, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=897553); See also Jerry Kang,
Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. RE V. 1489 (2005)(focusing on research in social
cognition rather than behavioral economics).
35
See PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (Cass R. Sunstein et al., eds. 2002);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and
Valuation in Law),” 107 YALE L. J. 2071 (1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of
Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD . 313 (2001).
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included projects covering the hindsight bias36 , the endowment effect 37 ,
framing effects 38 , the overconfidence effect 39 and others40 .
Though behavioral economic research has tested the influence of a
large number of situational and contextual influences on decision-making,
there still remain other documented influences on thought that have generally
been overlooked in the context of financial decision-making. These influences
not only may affect financial decision- making, but are likely to fluctuate in
importance across cultures. For example, the in-group/out-group bias shows
how people tend to give the benefit to members of their own group . 41 Though
this bias has been applied considerably in the legal context 42 , its effects on
traditional economic judgments (such as the financial value of objects) have
not been tested.
Another bias-like mechanism is the effect of morality information on
decision-making. This effect, as demonstrated by the principle of “culpable
causation”, indicates that people are more likely to attribute the cause of an
action to a low moral actor compared to a high moral actor.43 Alicke showed,
for example, that Americans are more likely to attribute causal blame for a car
accident to drug dealing drivers (compared to good husband drivers), even
when the morality of the drivers was unrelated to the accident. 44 Though
36

See Rachlinski, supra note __. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 IOWA J. CORP . L. 715
(2003). Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
Conclusions, 31 A RIZ. ST . L.J. 1277 (1999); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical
Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR . L. RE V.
587 (1994).
37
See Korobkin supra note __; Arlen et al., supra note __.
38
See Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI L. REV. 163 (2000); Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive
Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. RE V. 1341 (1995); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property
Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX RE V. 797
(2005).
39
See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1569 (2000); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference:
Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA ST . U. L. RE V.
673 (2005)(discussing overconfidence effects on CEO’s).
40
See April M. Perry, Comment: Guilt by Saturation: Media Liability for Third-Party
Violence and the Availability Heuristic, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1045 (2003).
41
Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A
Cognitive-Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979).
42
See Anthony Page, Batson's Blind Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155 (2005); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. RE V. 623 (2005).
43
Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368
(1992).
44
Id.
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culpable causation is well documented and has also been incorporated into
legal scholarship,45 it has been generally overlooked in the financial arena,
perhaps due to a perceived incompatibility between morality and economic
decisions.
Due to their influence on causal attributions and responsibility
judgments, however, one might hypothesize that out-group bias and morality
effects could similarly affect the way people judge the financial value of
objects. For example, a person might estimate the financial value of an object
differently based on whether the possessor of the object is an in-group or outgroup member (even when objective anchors are held constant). In addition,
because these effects have been shown to vary across cultures, 46 they might
serve to illustrate how financial estimates are made differently across cultures.
C. Cultural Psychology and Biases across Cultures
Despite the great strides psychologists and behavioral economists
have taken in identifying deviations from rational economic thought,
scholars often fail to investigate whether cross-cultural differences could
illustrate that deviations from rational economic thought are less than
universal. Because most of the evidence on human rationality (or
irrationality) is based on theories and evidence developed by Western
scholars, assumptions generated by these scholars may themselves be
affected by culturally guided assumptions about human minds, desires and
rationality.
Cultural psychology, the study of how culture affects the way people
think, has recently challenged many previously universalistic assumptions
regarding human behavior. 47 For instance, the fundamental attribution error
had previously been assumed to be a universal bias. However, mounting crosscultural psychological evidence suggests that the fundamental attribution error
may be more an effect of American individualist tendencies than a universal
phenomenon. 48 Recent studies by Nisbett, Peng, and their colleagues have
45

See Neal R. Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. RE V. 741
(1999-2000); Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A
Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law’s Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries,
13 SO. CAL. INTERDISC . L.J. 195 (2004).
46
See Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Collective Causal Inquiries: How CultureSpecific Theories of Agency Affect Culpable Causation and Legal Judgments (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author, 2006)(empirically examining culpable causation across
culture in legal scenarios).
47
Richard A. Shweder, Cultural Psychology - What Is It, in CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
(James W. Stigler et al. eds., 1990).
48
See Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation,
46 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984). See also Michael Morris & Kaiping
Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical
Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 949 (1994).
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revealed significant cognitive differences between individuals from East Asia
and people of Western European cultural descent, typically in the United
States.49 These scholars have attempted to categorize the cognitive differences
found in those cultural regions as either 'analytic' or 'holistic.'50 Many studies
have shown that, relative to one another, Americans tend to focus on the
dispositions of objects (using ‘analytic’ cognitive patterns that might derive
from Greek philosophy) while Chinese tend to focus on contextual background
(using ‘holistic’ patterns that might derive from Chinese philosophy) in
reasoning processes and making judgments.51
Though cultural psychologists have concerned themselves more with
cognitive theories of culture than economic judgments, their work can be (and
sometimes has been) applied to a behavioral economic framework. Here, we
briefly review some of the fundamental biases and heuristics in behavioral
economic literature, and describe how these biases function across Eastern and
Western cultures. In most cases, sufficient work has been done so that we can
report limited results indicating how these biases systematically operate across
cultures. Our review illustrates not only that culture influences economic
decision-making and cognitive biases, but also that it forms a complex
framework from which one can meaningfully analyze economic decisionmaking. It also demonstrates that many more studies need to be conducted.
Risk tolerance preferences emerge as one clear source of cultural
differences. In a series of studies, Weber and Hsee examined cultural
differences in risk preference (e.g., choosing between a smaller sure gain
versus a larger but more risky gain). 52 They found that Chinese were more risk
seeking than Americans.53 However, this difference was found to be specific
to the financial domain. 54 In the socia l domain, the pattern was reversed.55
49

See Li-Jun Ji et al, Culture, Change, and Prediction, 12 P SYCHOL. SCI . 450 (2001);
RICHARD E. NISBETT , THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT : HOW A SIANS AND W ESTERNERS
THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND W HY (2003); Richard E. Nisbett & Takahiko Masuda, Culture
and Point of View, 100 PROC. NAT ’L A CAD. SCI . U.S. 11163 (2003); Richard E. Nisbett et
al., Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 P SYCHOL.
REV. 291 (2001).
50
See Nisbett, et al., supra note __.
51
See Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning About
Contradiction, 54 A M. P SYCHOLOGIST 741 (1999). See also Kaiping Peng et al, Naïve
Dialecticism and the Tao of Chinese Thought, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDIGENOUS AND
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 247 (U. Kim et al. eds., 2006).
52
Elke U. Weber & Christopher K. Hsee, Models and Mosaics: Investigation of
Cultural Differences in Risk Perception and Risk Preference. 6 P SYCHONOMIC BULL . &
REV. 611 (1999). See also Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, Cross-National
Differences in Risk Preferences and Lay Predictions for the Differences. 12 J. BEHAV.
DECISION M AKING 165 (1999).
53
Id.
54
In the financial domain, participants were asked to choose between two options

12

Levinson & Peng

28-Apr-06

Chinese were found to be less risk seeking. Congruent cultural differences also
emerged when the authors analyzed the risk seeking (or risk avoiding) advice
implied in Chinese and American proverbs, suggesting deep cultural roots in
risk preference.56
Two studies conducted by psychologists in China challenge the cultural
universality of framing effects and tend to indicate that framing effects operate
in complex ways across cultures. Xiao Tian Wang found that Chinese were
not affected by the framing in traditional Tversky and Kahneman paradigms,
but when the numbers used in the study were increased to larger figures,
Chinese started to demonstrate framing effects. 57 In another study, Ming Wang
and her colleagues tested framing effects in six different risk judgments in the
US and China. 58 Results indicated that framing effects persisted across
cultures, but that in five of the six risk judgment scenarios, effects were
stronger for Americans than for Chinese. Wang and her colleagues explained
these results by referencing different societal beliefs about risk management.
Psychologists have yet to test how framing effects operate across cultures in
non-risk domains, such as financial value estimations. Societal beliefs about
risk management, however, would not likely translate to financial judgments
when risk is not an issue.
A counter- intuitive cultural difference between Eastern and Western
people is Asian overconfidence in probability judgments. Wright and Phillips
carried out the first cross-cultural comparison between Chinese and British
participants on probability judgments, 59 and found that the British had a greater
tendency to view the world in terms of uncertainty than did Hong Kong
Chinese. British people were more likely to ascribe different degrees of
uncertainty to events, and could then express the uncertainty as a numerical
probability in response to general knowledge questions. Chinese, on the other
hand, were more likely to make extreme probability estimations (e.g., "100%"
or "no chance"). 60 These findings have been confirmed by more recent
experiments undertaken in the United States, Japan, China, and other Asian
involving financial instruments such as lottery tickets or shares of stock. Id.
55
In the social domain, participants were asked to choose between two options
involving social relationships, such as meeting new friends. Id.
56
Id. Hsee and Weber also found that the cultural differences in the financial domain
were mediated by the larger size and better quality of the Chinese participants’ social
networks. It should also be noted that the cultural differences were found to result from
different perceptions of the riskiness of the choices, not from different risk-value tradeoffs.
57
Xiao Tian Wang, Framing Effects: Dynamics and Task Domains, 68(2)
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 145 (1996).
58
Ming Wang et al., Culture, Dialectics and The Effect of Framing, Paper Presented
at the International Congress of Psychology in Beijing (2004).
59
George N. Wright & Lawrence D. Phillips, Cultural Variation in Probabilistic
Thinking: Alternative Ways of Dealing with Uncertainty, 15 INT ’L J. PSYCHOL. 239 (1980).
60
Id.
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countries. 61 Yates and his colleagues suggested that Chinese participants'
overconfidence may arise from the fact that Chinese usually generate fewer
counter-arguments in making judgments. 62
Carnevale theorized that the endowment effect 63 may not influence
people from collectivistic cultures because of their emphasis on group
ownership rather than on individual ownership.64 Applying the cultural
psychological theory of individualism and collectivism, 65 Carnevale studied
how adjusting an ownership variable (e.g. presenting property as either
individually or group-owned) affected judgments in individualistic and
collectivistic individuals. 66 He found that collectivist people displayed a
“group endowment effect,” but not the traditional (individual) endowment
effect. These results indicate that endowment effects are culturally sensitive.
However, it is important to note that Carnevale’s study was conducted solely
on Americans that were classified as individualistic or collectivistic. The
study did not actually test the endowment effect across cultures. We will
discuss such a possibility in the context of debiasing, infra Section V.
Three cross-cultural studies have compared how hindsight bias
functions across Far Eastern and Western cultures, revealing mixed results.
Heine and Lehman found that Japanese and Canadians exhibited similar
hindsight biases under some instructions, but that Canadians showed a
marginally more pronounced bias than Japanese under other instructions.67
The researchers observed that while both cultures in their study exhibited
some hindsight bias, Canadians demonstrated stronger effects than Japanese
when they were presented with self-enhancing memory opportunities. 68
61

J. Frank Yates, et al., General Knowledge Overconfidence: Cross-national
Variations, Response Style, and "Reality". 70 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 87 (1997); J. Frank Yates et al., Beliefs About Overconfidence, Including its
Cross-National Variation. 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 138
(1996).
62
Id. Such a culture-specific characteristic may have roots in Chinese educational
practices. In Chinese classrooms, teachers do not encourage questions or criticisms of
textbooks and lectures, whereas the development of critical thinking is central to the
ideology of American education.
63
See Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 39 (1980); W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ? 81(3) A M. ECON. REV. 635 (1991).
64
Peter J. Carnevale, Property, Culture, and Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION AS A
SOCIAL PROCESS (R. Kramer & D. M. Messick, eds., 1995).
65
See HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM (1995); Tahira M.
Probst et al., Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas. 77
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 171 (1999).
66
Id.
67
Steven J. Heine & Darrin R. Lehman, Hindsight Bias: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, 35
JAPANESE J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 317 (1996).
68
Id.
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A study done by Choi and Nisbett, however, cuts in the opposite
direction from Heine and Lehman’s findings. Choi and Nisbett found that
East Asians are less likely than Americans to experience surprise, and will
therefore display more hindsight bias. 69 Pohl and colleagues tested
hindsight bias globally using internet participants from Asia, Australia,
Europe, and North America. 70 Their study revealed hindsight bias of
varying degrees across samples. German and Dutch participants, however,
demonstrated no hindsight bias whatsoever. 71
Taken together, cross-cultural studies have frequently shown that
cultural differences emerge in complex, yet systematic ways. Our analysis of
their findings also shows, however, that existing cross cultural findings have
still only scratched the surface of developing a competent cross-cultural model
of decision-making. Nonetheless, the importance of understanding cultural
influences on thought emerges as a clear theme for those who want to create
accurate decision-making models.
D. Cultural Psychology in Legal Discourse
Cultural psychology’s emergence has only recently begun to appear in
legal scholarship. Licht and Mitchell were among the first commentators to
discuss cultural psychology generally in the context of behavioral law and
economics, each sounding a caution to legal scholars that cognitive
assumptions are not stable.72 Levinson, Peng and Wang critiqued certain
fundamental aspects of contract formation, and argued that Western models of
contract may not be appropriate for diverse understandings of contractual
interactions.73 Levinson and Peng applied specific cultural psychological
principles to substantive legal inquiries, and analyzed how culture influences
decision-making in judgments of causation and foreseeability. 74 Levinson
tested mental state attributions across cultures and found that such attributions
vary across cultures in ways that do not match legal assumptions. 75 Rachlinski
69

Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, Cultural Psychology of Surprise: Holistic
Theories and Recognition of Contradiction, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. P SYCHOL. 890
(2000).
70
Rudiger Pohl et al., Hindsight Bias Around the World, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 270 (2002).
71
Id.
72
See Licht, Legal Plug-Ins, supra note __; Licht, The Mother of all Path
Dependencies, supra note __; Mitchell, Perfect Rationality, supra note __. Mitchell’s
discussion of cultural psychology included consideration of overconfidence effects across
culture. See also Mitchell, Mapping Evidence Law, supra note __.
73
Justin D. Levinson, Kaiping Peng & Lei Wang, Let’s Make a Deal: Understanding
the Cultural Psychological Basis of Contract Formation (2003) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the authors).
74
Levinson & Peng, supra note __.
75
Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore
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acknowledged the importance of cultural differences while discussing legal
paternalism and intervention relating to cognitive biases, citing research
indicating that people from certain collectivist cultures are more willing to take
risky gambles. 76 Though legal scholars have begun to understand the
importance of cultural psychology in the law, and cultural differences have
recently entered discussions of risk preferences, 77 behavioral economists and
legal scholars have yet to sufficiently incorporate cultural differences into
economic and financial decision- making models. 78
E. Predictions Connecting Cultural Psychology and Behavioral
Economics: Studying Financial Estimates of Object Values
In applying cultural psychological theory to economic judgments, one
might expect that cross-cultural differences would manifest in the ways people
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW . L. J. 601
(2005)(arguing for culturally competent legal rules).
76
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, supra note __, citing Elke U. Weber & Christopher Hsee,
Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, but Cross-Cultural Similarities in Attitudes
Towards Perceived Risk, 44 M GMT . SCI . 1205, 1208 (1998).
77
Kahan et al., supra note __. Kahan and his colleagues use a concept that they call
“cultural cognition” to critique Cass Sunstein’s book, focusing primarily on cultural
preferences and their influences on risk perception. “Cultural cognition,” as used by Kahan
and his colleagues, is distinguishable from the psychological field of “culture and
cognition.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110
(2006)(responding to this critique). Sunstein argues that Kahan and his colleagues’
“cultural cognition” model “is largely a result of bounded rationality, not an alternative to
it.” Whether or not Sunstein’s criticism of Kahan and his colleagues’ model of “cultural
cognition” is correct, we do not believe that such a criticism would apply to our model,
which rests on more traditional conceptions of “culture and cognition” from the field of
cultural psychology. We do not argue that cultural psychology provides us with an
alternative to bounded rationality. Instead, we argue that it should inform bounded
rationality and offer solutions to it. For more on the cultural psychological field of “culture
and cognition,” a sub-field of cultural psychology, see Richard E. Nisbett & Ara
Norenzayan, Culture and Cognition, in STEVENS' HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY : COGNITION 561 (D. L. Medin ed., 3rd ed. 2001); Richard E. Nisbett et al.,
supra note __; Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames & Eric Knowles, Culture and Human
Inference, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 245 (D. Matsumoto ed., 2001).
Culture and cognition projects have grown in cultural psychology over the past decade,
including the establishment of a culture and cognition program at the University of
Michigan (and elsewhere).
78
Although the authors argue for a culturally competent model of behavioral
economics, we do not believe that cultural psychologists have nothing to learn from
economists. In fact, much of the previous work in cultural psychology has simply focused
on people’s reactions to laboratory cognitive tasks. Rather than continue to focus on the
laboratory setting, cultural psychologists should test the role of cultural differences in
meaningful aspects of everyday behavior, in which individuals enact their culturallyinfluenced cognitive styles. Risk analysis is one area where studies have begun to bridge
laboratory and everyday reality. See Rachlinski supra note __.
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estimate the financial value of objects. More specifically, because Americans
have been shown to be more object focused than East Asians (as illustrated by
the fundamental attribution error), it would be reasonable to predict that
Americans will be less sensitive to contextual or situational information
provided about an object’s surroundings, and will be more likely to make
financial judgments based upon assumed intrinsic object values. On the other
hand, because Chinese have been shown to be more situation focused than
Americans, one might expect that they would judge the financial value of an
object in a manner more consistent with contextual cues. As a result, one could
predict that two cross-cultural effects would emerge in a cross-cultural study of
financial value estimation. First, Chinese would be more sensitive than
Americans to the economic and social context of the objects. Specifically,
when the financial value of an object is being measured over time, Chinese
would be more likely to incorporate social and economic factors into value
estimations during the time period being referenced. Second, Chinese would
be more sensitive than Americans to independent variables that manipulate
aspects of context or situation (such as framing the object as lost or found, or
varying the morality of a person that possesses an object).
We tested these questions in China and the US as part of a study of
financial value estimations. 79 Specifically, we tested the following
variables, each with respect to financial value estimations : (1) cultural
differences; (2) framing effects and loss aversion; (3) morality effects; and
(4) out- group bias. Based on systematic psychological differences in
cognitive orientations between Americans and Chinese, and because of the
changing economic conditions in the US and China during the reference
period of the study, we made the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Chinese will make different value estimations than
Americans, a result consistent both with differing styles of judgment as well as
with the dramatic socioeconomic changes in China over the past twenty years;
and
Hypothesis 2: Chinese value estimations will be more affected by
79

In addition to their differing cultural psychological profiles, these locations also
represent two of the most interesting economic regions in the world. The US maintains a
position as an economic power. In China, the economic landscape has undergone
substantial change as it has moved from a socialist planned economy to a capitalist market
economy. During that time, which began in 1978, China has enjoyed phenomenal growth
and inflation. Since 1985, Chinese average annual inflation rates have been around 9.13%
with two periods of double digits inflation growth from 1987-1990 and 1993-1995 (figures
from Chinese National Bureau of Statis tics). During the same time period, the average
annual inflation rates in the US have been relative stable, averaging 4.1% from 1985 to
2004 (figures from NASA), when this study was conducted.
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experimental manipulations to situational variables, given Chinese people’s
higher level of holistic cognitions. Hence, Chinese people will show
stronger framing (lose/find) effects, in-group vs out-group differences in
value estimation, and stronger morality information effects than Americans.
III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY- VALUE ESTIMATION ACROSS CULTURES
A. Methods
Participants. Two hundred thirty one Chinese participants participated
in the study. The average age for Chinese participants was 27.68 years old.
Three hundred eighty four Americans participated in the study. One
hundred forty three of these American participants were Caucasian and one
hundred eighty five were Asian-American. Fifty six other Americans
participated, but only seventeen listed their ethnicity. The average age for
Caucasian Americans was 21.59 years old. The average age for Asian
Americans was 20.39 old. No significant differences emerged between
Caucasian and Asian-American responses.
Materials. Participants were asked to jud ge the financial value of four
objects (a gold ring, an antique chair, commemorative coins, and a
municipal bond) when a value approximately 20 years prior had been given.
By examining judgments of financial values of objects, we could
simultaneously evaluate cognitive understandings of economic principles
(such as inflation and return on investment) and test how situational factors
(such as cognitive biases) may influence fundamental economic decisionmaking across cultures. The independent variables we tested included: (1)
culture (Chinese v. American) (2) frame (losing v. finding the object), (3)
morality information about the actors (drug dealer, nurse, philanthropist,
burglar), and (4) group identity (in- group and out-group membership),
hence a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 design. Depending upon the independent variable
condition, participants read variations of the following stories:
Lisa, a prostitute, was walking along the beach when she found a gold
ring in the sand. Unbeknownst to Lisa, the ring had been purchased in
1985. According to World Jeweler, an international jewelry appraisal
publication, the ring was worth 100 Dollars at the time it was
purchased.
Jason, a social worker from your home town, recently moved to a new
apartment. When unpacking, he found an antique chair that was
accidentally delivered to his house along with his belongings. There is
no tracking label or other identification information on the chair’s
packaging, and the moving company tells him to keep the chair. Jason
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does not know how much the chair is worth. However, an old issue of
Antique Magazine indicates that the chair was worth 350 Dollars in
1985.
Glenn is a scientist who works for an illegal organization that designs
the illegal synthetic drug ‘ice’. Recently, Glenn moved into a new
apartment. When he was looking at the top of his closet for a place to
store his extra belongings, he found a municipal bond that was
purchased for 200 dollars in 1985. The bond has not yet matured. The
bond does not have a name endorsed on it, so that anyone can keep it or
cash it.
David is a drug dealer. He was recently walking in the park when he
sat down on a bench to make a phone call. Looking down, he noticed
an envelope partially covered in dirt. Opening the envelope, David
found that the envelope contained rare commemorative coins. David
does not know how much the coins are worth. David doesn’t know it,
but in 1985 a collectibles auction house valued the coins at 500 Dollars.
Participants in the “low moral” condition read stories about all low moral
actors. For example, instead of reading about Jason, a social worker,
participants read about Jason, a burglar. Participants in the “high moral”
condition read stories about all good moral actors. For example, instead of
reading about Glenn, a scientist for an illegal drug manufacturer,
participants read about Glenn, an AIDS researcher. For the framing
condition, half of the participants read stories about actors who found
objects of value, such as in each of the examples above. The other half of
participants read stories about actors who lost the exact same objects of
value. For example, participants in the “low-moral lose” condition read the
following story about David:
David is a drug dealer. He was recently walking in the park when he
sat down on a bench to make a phone call. As he sat down, an envelope
containing rare commemorative coins slipped out of his pant pocket and
onto the ground. David had received the coins from a friend, but he did
not know how much they were worth. David doesn’t know it, but in
1985 a collectibles auction house valued the coins at 500 Dollars.
As a result, the only difference between the “lose” framed condition
and “find” framed condition was the perspective presented. The 1985
financial anchor was identical.
Materials were created in English with consideration for cross-
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cultural understanding of the concepts. The 1985 financial anchor values
were given to Americans in US Dollars and to Chinese in Chinese currency
(RMB). The survey was translated into Mandarin Chinese by a bilingual
research associate and back translated into English by a bilingual research
assistant. Resolution of translation discrepancies was made by group
consensus of the authors and translators.
The dependent variable measured financial estimates of object
values. 80 Participants were given the following written instruction: “Please
give your best estimate of how much the coins are worth today. Do not
give a range. Only give an exact amount.” In order to work with
comparable value estimates, we converted raw dependent variable value
estimation scores into a summary index that presents the ratio of value
increase from the objects’ anchor value in 1985. For example, a person that
estimated the ring’s value to be $1,000 (recall that the ring’s value in 1985
was $100) was converted to a 10.0 ratio, indicating that the current value of
the item was estimated as 10 times greater than the 1985 value.
Procedures. We administered the questionnaires to students in China
and the US. American participants at a major public university participated
as part of a psychology course credit requirement. Chinese participants
were recruited through the psychology department at a major public
university in Beijing. Participants in China were each paid a small amount
to participate.
B. Results
Cultural Differences in Value Estimations. The results show that
Chinese estimated values of all four objects higher than Americans. Figure
1 illustrates the substantial cultural differences in people’s estimates of
value for all four objects, and shows the mean value estimate ratios for each
of the four objects, displayed by country.

80

Other dependent variable measures included judgments of property ownership. See
Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Owning Up to Cognitive Biases: Extraneous
Variables, Culture, and Property Ownership Judgments (unpublished manuscript, 2006, on
file with authors).
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Value Ratio

Figure 1: Cultural Differences in Object Value Estimation Ratios
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For the ring, Chinese estimations were 19.95 times the 1985 value
while American estimations were only 4.70 times the 1985 value, F (1, 577)
= 9.02 , p< .01. For the antique chair, Chinese estimations were 12.02 times
the 1985 value while American estimations were only 2.83 times the 1985
value, F (1, 576) = 32.80, p<.001. For the bond, Chinese estimations were
11.55 times the 1985 value while American estimations were only 4.90
times the 1985 value, F (1, 575) = 20.61, p<.001. For the coins, Chinese
estimations were 14.74 times the 1985 value while American estimations
were only 3.99 times the 1985 value, F (1, 574) = 36.51, p<.001. We also
combined each participant’s estimations across the four stories and
generated a combined index for each participant. We ran a 2*2*2*2
Multivariate Analysis on this combined index and found main effects for
culture such that Chinese made significantly higher value estimations than
Americans, F (1, 578) = 39.57, p< .001.
Table 1 displays the 1985 value anchors given to participants, as
well as the inflation adjusted amounts 81 and the raw American and Chinese
value judgments for each of the four objects. When value judgments were
adjusted for inflation in the two countries, the results indicated that,
generally, Chinese still made higher value estimations than Americans, for
81

To calculate the inflation adjusted values, we used the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
for the US as provided by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. For China,
we used CPI figures as reported by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.

US
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the chair, T (575) = 3.528, p< .001, and for the coins T (573) = 3.421, p =
.001, and marginally for the ring, T (576) = 1.82, p= .071. 82 The difference
between inflation adjusted value estimations for the bond was not
significant, a result that will be discussed below. For example, for the value
of the coins, Americans estimated an inflation-adjusted value of 2.28 times
the 1985 value. Chinese estimated an inflation-adjusted value of 4.72 times
the 1985 value. These results indicate that, even taking into account the
vastly different inflation rates, Chinese generally perceived more
appreciation in the value of the objects than Americans. Table 2 displays
the mean value ratios as scored by participants, as well as the inflation
adjusted value ratios taking into account inflation in the two countries.
Table 1
Values Estimations by Country
_____________________________________________________________
Values
(1985)

CPI Adjusted Values (2004)

U.S.

Value Estimations (2004)

China

U.S

China

___________________________________________________________________________________________

Ring

100

175.60

321.31

469.97

1994.70

Chair

350

614.60

1093.08

991.93

4206.27

Bond

200

351.20

624.61

982.35

2310.92

Coin
500
878.00
1561.54
2002.38
7371.79
_____________________________________________________________
Table 2
Value Estimation Ratios (1985-2004) by Country
_____________________________________________________________
Value Judgment Ratios

U.S.

China

Ratios Adjusted for Inflation

U.S.

China

___________________________________________________________________________________________

Ring

4.70

19.95

2.68

6.21

Chair

2.83

12.02

1.61

3.85

Bond

4.90

11.55

2.80

3.70

Coin
3.99
14.75
2.28
4.72
_____________________________________________________________
82

For these t-tests, equal variances were not assumed.
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Table 3 shows the value estimations in terms of annual percentage
increase assumed from 1985 to 2004. These results raise two interesting
points. First, they indicate that participants’ assumptions regarding object
appreciation outpaced inflation, but did so in a somewhat modest way.
Second, these results highlight how big the mean differences were between
American and Chinese estimates. For example, Americans estimated that
the chair value increased by an average of under 6% per year. Chinese
estimated that the chair value increased by an average of 14.81% per year.
Americans estimated that the ring value increased by an average of 8.98%.
Chinese estimated that the ring value increased by an average of 16.12% per
year. See Table 3 and Figure 2.
Table 3
Average Annual Assumed Percentage Appreciation by Country83
_________________________________
U.S.

China

__________________________________________________

Ring

8.98

18.09

Chair

5.96

14.81

Bond

9.25

14.56

Coin
8.01
16.12
_________________________________
There were some notable differences in value estimations between
the objects. Out of the four objects possible, Americans judged the bond as
the highest appreciating object since 1985. Chinese, however, judged the
bond as the lowest appreciating object, perhaps indicating systematic
cultural differences in the types of objects that are perceived as gaining the
most value over time (which may have cross-cultural implications in
expected investment return). This phenomenon may explain the failure to
find significant differences between Americans and Chinese on the inflation
adjusted bond scores. It is interesting to note that in both countries, bonds
are government- issued securities, while the other objects are not. Other
83

We calculated this assumed appreciation rate using the following formula: Final
value = Base value × (1 + X) n-1 , where Base value refers to the object value in 1985; Final
value refers to the object value in 2004; X refers to assumed annual percentage of
appreciation; N is 19 (from 1985 to 2004).
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than with respect to bonds, Americans and Chinese agreed upon which
objects appreciated the most. Both Americans and Chinese believed that
the gold ring appreciated more than the coins, which in turn appreciated
more than the antique chair. See Table 2.

Annual Percentage

Figure 2: Assumed Annual Percentage of Appreciation by Country

20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

China

ring

chair

bond

coins

Other Independent Variable Effects. A MANOVA was conducted
on the composite index to test main effects and interaction effects of all of
the independent variables. In addition to the main effect for culture, the
results showed a main effect for the frame (lose/find) variable, such that
participants who read about a person losing an item scored the item as more
valuable (m= 13.14) than participants who read about a person finding the
identical item (m= 6.18), F (1,578) = 14.56, p <.001. See Figure 3. This
main effect is consistent with prospect theory in that losses loom larger than
gains. However, because this study tested intrinsic financial values (by
asking the value of the object), rather than the perceived utility, our results
indicate that prospect theory’s effects might in part derive from assumptions
regarding intrinsic value rather than utility. There were no main effects for
the morality and in- group/out-group variables, though interaction effects did
emerge.
The MANOVA on the composite index indicated a significant
interaction effect for the culture and framing (lose/find) variables. This
interaction effect appeared to demonstrate that much of the framing main

US
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effects can be explained by an interaction with the culture variable, F (1,
578) = 12.19, p = 001. This interaction effect appeared to indicate that
Chinese value estimations varied greatly based on the framing variable (m
lose = 21.84; m find = 8.70), while American value estimations only varied
slightly based on the framing variable (m lose = 4.25; m find = 3.67).
Figure 3 shows the interaction effect between culture and the framing
variable. Interestingly, these results show that Chinese display framing and
loss aversion patterns that are more consistent with prospect theory than
American responses.

Value Ratio

Figure 3: Framing Effects in Value Estimations

22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

China

Find

Lose

There was also a significant two way interaction for the ingroup/out- group variable and morality variable, F (1, 578) = 8.70, p < 01.
This interaction effect appeared to show that participants scored object
values as highest for low- moral in- group members (m = 13.31) and lowest
for low-moral out-group members (m = 6.07).
This interaction effect can be better explained by reference to two
three way interactions: group X morality X frame, and group X morality X
culture. The group X morality X frame effect on the composite index, F (1,
578) = 8.58, p <. 01, suggested that the above two way interaction between
group membership and morality was more salient for the loss condition than
for the find condition. In- group low moral actors and out- group high moral
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actors who lost the objects received the highest value estimations. These
results seem to suggest that people make value estimations based upon
monetarily irrelevant information, including socially sensitive categories
such as group membership.
The three way interaction of group X morality X culture on the
composite index, F (1, 573) = 7.62, p < .01, appeared to indicate that while
US participant responses only varied slightly across morality and group,
Chinese participant responses judged financial values much differently
based on group and morality. Chinese participants scored the highest
values as those of low moral in- group members (m = 22.90). The lowest
values were of low moral out-group members (m = 8.00). High moral outgroup members (m = 17.85) and high moral in-group members (m = 12.11)
received value scores in the middle. Figure 4 shows the three way
interaction of group X morality X culture and illustrates the large variance
in Chinese value scores based on group and morality. Once again, these
results suggest not only that financial values can be very susceptible to
seemingly irrelevant information, but also that Chinese are more sensitive
than Americans to contextual information and variables. See Figure 4.
Figure 4: Out-Group Effects, Morality Information, and Cultural Differences
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IV. DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS : BRIDGING BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
The primary objectives of our empirical study were to examine cultural
differences and the influence of (both relevant and irrelevant) contextual
factors on people’s financial values estimates. The study demonstrated that
there are dramatic cultural differences in the ways that people make financial
estimates. In general, Chinese estimated object values as much higher than
Americans and did so by a large margin. Initially, these results might appear to
be consistent with economic conditions—China has witnessed more inflation
than America over the past twenty years. Yet even adjusting for the uneven
inflation rates did not explain our results. Chinese still assumed higher object
appreciation than Americans did. The reason for this fundamental difference in
value estimations is initially unclear. One possibility is that Chinese responses
more accurately reflect Chinese financial conditions than the published
inflation rates in China. However, such a possibility is difficult to account for
and measure.
Consistent with psychological theory proposing models of East Asian
holistic rationality, our findings also show that Chinese people were more
sensitive to our behavioral experimental manipulations. Contextual
information, such as framing effects, an actor’s morality, and group
membership affected participants’ estimates of financial value, particularly for
Chinese. Group membership and morality information have long been
implicitly assumed by economists to be irrele vant to the financial values of
given objects. However, this study found that such experimental manipulations
do affect value estimates, and that the strength and persistence of these effects
on financial value estimates depends upon the cultural background of the
people making financial judgments.
The fact that financial value estimations are susceptible to
contextual variation, such as framing effects, group membership and
morality information implies that value estimations are not solely guided by
the intrinsic value of the property combined with economic conditions.
Instead, our results indicate that financial value estimations are a function of
four factors: the perceived intrinsic value of the objects, the social and
situational characteristics of the object possessor, the culture of the
perceiver, and contextual factors (such as socioeconomic conditions or
supply and demand). In order to understand the value of objects, one has to
understand all four components. This holistic approach is perhaps most
relevant for understanding the value estimations of East Asians. In fact,
such a holistic model of economic rationality is consistent with cultural
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psychological theories of East Asian epistemologies.
While we do suggest that a universalistic approach to financial
principles would be better guided by reference to cultural variation, we are
not suggesting that the basic principles of behavioral finance and behavioral
economics are wrong. Rather, the results of this study show that certain
elements of prospect theory are valid. For instance, the frame (lose/find)
variable showed that framing effects and loss aversion operate in value
estimations. People valued objects framed as lost to be more valuable than
objects framed as found. Still, the cultural difference existed there as well.
Chinese made much higher estimations for objects lost than objects found,
particularly when the people who lost the objects were low moral out-group
members.
Understanding how individuals estimate the financial va lue of given
objects is relevant to the basic assumptions of modern behavioral, social,
and economic sciences. Few previous studies have examined individuals’
financial value estimating behavior across cultural groups and situational
conditions. This study found that cultures differ in their value estimations,
as well as their tendency to take social and contextual information into
account when making those estimations. These cultural differences may
lead to real life economic and business implications-- in international
business transactions, in understanding economic incentives and self
interest, in corporate strategic planning, in evaluating asset portfolios and
investments, and in legal decision-making.
Like the economic sciences that it embraces, scho larship in
behavioral law and economics should embrace culture as an important
variable in decision- making. Though previous studies have begun to
suggest that cultural variation must be understood as a systematic influence
in decision-making, 84 most behavioral economic scholarship continues to
assume that deviations from expected utility are systematic. But as our
results have demonstrated, all people do not deviate from expected utility in
the same way. Scholarship in behavioral law and economics thus sits at an
interesting crossroads. It properly embraces the role of humanity and
human thought in the law and it actively seeks to improve models of law by
adding an understanding of the way people think. But it fails to recognize
that the human understand ing it embraces is at best a Western-only human
understanding. 85
84

See Licht, supra note __; Mitchell, supra note __; Levinson & Peng, supra note __;
Levinson, supra note ___; Rachlinski, supra note ___.
85
It may, however, be a Western human understanding that ignores not just
international differences, but even the cultural diversity within Western societies. Such
cultural diversity, within an increasingly diverse United States for example, would be better
reflected with a culturally competent model of behavioral economics.
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V: DEBIASING THROUGH CULTURAL COMPETENCY
Beyond its descriptive promise for building accurate behavioral
models, cultural psychological knowledge holds promise for debiasing efforts.
There are two ways in which understanding cultural psychological influences
on decision-making can improve legal reform efforts: through cultural training
and through model building.
Cultural Training. One straightforward way to harness culture’s
debiasing potential is to develop methods of cross-cultural training-- exposing
and immersing people into known cultural environments. 86 Every human
grows up inside a cultural environment that is loaded with culture-specific
assumptions, 87 worldviews, 88 modes of psychological functioning, 89 modes of
reasoning, 90 patterns of judgment and decision making, 91 implicit theories of
the self and the world,92 and more. A debiasing cultural training program
would immerse debiasing candidates in cultural systems selected to leverage
cultural knowledge and broaden cultural awareness of cognitive and decision
alternatives. Though cultural training has not been suggested as a debiasing
tool in behavioral economics, the concept of cultural training is not new to the
law. Cultural training programs of different sorts have been proposed by
commentators in a variety of legal arenas, including legal counseling, 93 racial
86

Cross-cultural training programs are quite common to areas outside of the law, and
have flourished recently in the international business community. A basic web search
reveals scores of companies marketing themselves as cultural training progra ms, including
“culturalsavvy.com” (which “offers a variety of customizable training programs and
workshops,”
www.culturalsavvy.com,
last
visited
4/22/06)
and
“culturesmartconsulting.com,” (which “offers face to face international management skills
training, cross cultural training, diversity and change management, international business
briefings, language training, cross cultural profiling…,” www.culturesmartconsulting.com,
last visited 4/22/06).
87
C. STRAUSS & N. QUINN, A COGNITIVE THEORY OF CULTURAL M EANING (1997).
88
DAN SPERBER, THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BELIEFS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF WIDESPREAD BELIEFS (1990).
89
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE 'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN
W ORK-RELATED VALUES (1980); PETER B. SMITH & M ICHAEL H. BOND, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY A CROSS CULTURES (1999); TRIANDIS, supra note __.
90
DOROTHY HOLLAND & NAOMI QUINN , CULTURAL M ODELS IN LANGUAGE AND
THOUGHT (1987); STEPHEN STICH , THE FRAGMENTATION OF REASON (1990).
91
Nisbett et al., supra note __; J. F. Yates & J. Lee, Chinese Decision-Making, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CHINESE PSYCHOLOGY (Michael H. Bond, ed. 1996).
92
Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments and Reactions:
A World from Two Perspectives. 6 P SYCHOL. INQUIRY 267 (1995); Kaiping Peng et al.,
Culture and Human Inference: Perspectives rf om Three Traditions, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 243 (D. Masumoto, ed., 2001).
93
Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 345 (1997); (focusing on clientcentered counseling training).
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discrimination,94 juvenile justice, 95 and others.96
Though debiasing by culture has not been attempted in behavioral
economics, recent research indicates that people shift their cognitive
orientations when immersed temporarily in another culture. This change in
cultural cognitive orientation occurred during an international exchange when a
group of American lawyers traveled to China for four weeks. During their
visit, they were taught by Chinese scholars, lived with Chinese counterparts
and discussed Chinese legal issues with Chinese lawyers. Before and after the
cultural immersion, Wang and his colleagues tested cognitive cultural
orientations using a measure of individualism and collectivism designed by
Triandis 97 and a measure of dialectical thinking designed by Rodgers, Peng and
their colleagues. 98 Results suggested that many of the Americans became at
least temporarily more collectivistic in their values and cognitive orientations. 99
The results of the China immersion project offer hope that crosscultural knowledge of cognitive patterns can be used to debias. For example,
suppose that we want to temporarily debias the endowment effect in a group of
Americans. 100 Our review of cognitive biases across cultures, supra Section
IIC, described how the endowment effect may depend upon a person’s or
culture’s sense of individual or group ownership.101 This research by
Carnevale is our first debiasing clue—that ownership expectations, a
phenomenon upon which the endowment effect is dependent, are different
across individuals with different cultural orientations.102
Our next debiasing clue comes from Markus and Kitayama,103 who
94

Joe Feagin et al., The Many Costs of Discrimination: The Case of Middle-Class
African Americans, 34 IND. L. REV. 1313 n123 (2001) (citing a variety of works that have
called for cultural training in order to reduce racial bias by psychotherapists).
95
Brent Pattison, Minority Youth in Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Culture
Differences and the Right to Treatment, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 573 (1998) (discussing cultural
competence and “cultural awareness training” in juvenile correctional facilities).
96
Ramon N. Valle, Ethics, Ethnicity, and Dementia: A "Culture-Fair" Approach to
Bioethical Advocacy in Dementing Illness, 35 GA. L. REV. 465, 482-83 (2001)(discussing
cultural competence and training in the context of bioethics).
97
TRIANDIS, supra note __.
98
Julie Rodgers et al., Dialectical Self and Psychological Well-Being. 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1416 (2004).
99
Frank Wang, Laura Young & Kaiping Peng, Teaching Cultures, (manuscript under
preparation at Kenneth Wang School of Law, Suzhou University (2006)).
100
Published reports have indicated only limited success in debiasing the endowment
effect. Arlen and her colleagues, however, reported success in eliminating the endowment
effect simply by changing corporate agency orientations. Arlen et. al, supra note __. See
also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note __ for a discussion of Arlen and her colleagues’ findings.
101
Carnevale, supra note __.
102
The results from our own research also show this difference in ownership
expectations. See Levinson & Peng, supra note __.
103
Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and Self: Implications for
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suggested that American self concepts tend be independent while East Asian
self concepts tend to be interdependent. According to Markus and Kitayama,
American independence “requires construing oneself as an individual whose
behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one’s
own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings and action, rather than by
reference to the thoughts, feelings and actions of others.”104 In contrast, East
Asian interdependence entails “seeing oneself as part of an encompassing
social relationship and recognizing that one’s behaviour is determined,
contingent on, and, to a large extent organized by what the actor perceives to be
the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship.”105
Based on this fundamental cultural difference, one can predict that for
members of independent cultures, an individual’s self concept will be defined
by both internal traits and external expressions (such as possessions, styles, and
unique behaviors).106 Possession of personal property could thus become an
important measure of self-worth. Given individualist societies’ tendencies to
encourage individual’s self-enhancement, 107 one can understand the
(unconscious) psychological desire to inflate the value of one’s possessions.
On the other hand, if the self is defined in relation to others (as it is in Asian
cultures), possessions would be more likely to be viewed as part of group
relations, and thus the value of personal property would not be directly
diagnostic of one’s self worth. Such is the precise rational behind Carnevale’s
group endowment effect. 108 If a brief cultural immersion can change
Americans’ cognitive cultural orientation to be more like Asian interdependent
selves, as it did in Wang and his colleagues’ experiment in China 109 , then the
endowment effect can similarly be debiased.110
Model Building and Legal Debiasing. Imagine a behavioral model so
accurate that it could not only identify all cognitive biases, but also could
explain why they function in certain cultural groups but not others. This model
Cognition, Emotion and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REV. 224 (1991).
104
Id. at 226.
105
Id. at 227.
106
See id.
107
Steven J. Heine et al., Is There a Universal Need for Positive Self-Regard? 106
PSYCHOL. REV. 766 (1999).
108
The group endowment effect might also serve as another explanation of Arlen et
al.’s successful debiasing research project, because shifting a person’s domain or cognitive
reference from an individual possession to corporate possession is analogous to individual
versus group property. See Arlen et al., supra note __. For more on the effect of cognitive
reference points in legal-decision making, see Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the
Expression of Community Values in Juries: How “Legal Priming” Systematically Alters
the Way People Think , 73 U. CIN. L. RE V. 1059 (2005)(arguing that placing citizens on
juries alters their cognitive reference points and therefore changes their decision-making).
109
See Wang et al., supra note __.
110
The authors are in the process of testing this proposition.
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could give behavioral and legal scholars a pan-universal understanding of
human behavior, 111 an understanding that will allow focus more on the
interaction between law and behavior than on correcting cognitive biases. In a
world with such a model, debiasing would not be needed because biases could
be avoided, embraced, combined, changed, or perhaps even disappear through
cultural transcendence. The ultimate debiasing tool, then, is not temporary
cultural training but an accurate, complete and culturally adept behavioral
model of human decision-making.
Not surprisingly, developing a complete behavioral model is a massive
task. Nonetheless, treating cultural variation as statistical noise will ensure the
continuation of current gaps in behavioral knowledge-- knowledge that could
tell us something useful about humanity, and therefore about law. As we have
demonstrated in this Article, cultural differences are not noise but meaningful
information that can help us develop more precise behavioral models that are
representative of human populations.112 In fact, examining cultural variation in
biases can ultimately lead to an understanding of the origins as well as the
cognitive functions of the biases. Temporary debiasing measures, on the other
hand, tend to focus researchers’ efforts more on tasks as repetitive solutions 113
than on understanding the bias itself. Once researchers can understand why all
people do not display the same biases, solutions begin to arise. It is not
difficult to learn under such a cross-cultural model: in every cross-cultural
study of a bias, there are a limited number of possible cultural variations. 114 In
each case, we learn about the bias. Cross-cultural work will therefore enable us
not only to understand biases themselves, but will allow us to explore other
cognitive limitations, discover novel behavioral phenomena, and develop a
culturally competent model of humanity.

111

The universality in our pan-universal model is not the same universality that we
have been criticizing—the assumption that all cultures think in the same way. We use the
term to describe shared characteristics of the human species as a whole. Our belief in a
potentially pan-universal model is based on the fact that there are similar universal laws in
a variety of related disciplines. For example, in biology there are well-established panspecies primary needs (such as eating, drinking, sleeping) even though their fulfillment is
achieved in very different ways in different species . In anthropology there are universal
customs (such as tool making). In behavioral legal scholarship, it is therefore plausible to
assume that we will also uncover pan-universal patterns of human behavior, even though
there will likely be wide variation across cultures in the ways in which these universal
patterns are developed, displayed, and deployed.
112
For other discussions of solutions through cultural knowledge, see Levinson &
Peng, supra note __ at 225; Levinson, supra note __ at 28.
113
With such repetitive solutions, researchers always face the possibility that the
debiasing measure will no longer work.
114
There are three: (1) one culture shows bias and the other does not; (2) both cultures
show different degrees of the bias; and (3) both cultures show the bias.
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VI: CONCLUSION: A CULTURAL SOLUTION?
Culture should be embraced as an important factor in models of
economic decision- making. Across a variety of cognitive domains, and as
demonstrated by our own study, people make economic decisions in vastly
different ways based upon their culture, the frame, as well as situational
information provided. At the least, these findings indicate that culture must
be embraced as an important variable in behavioral economic models. Yet
we believe that the importance of cultural understanding goes beyond
simply generating models of deviation from rational economic beha vior.
Incorporating cultural competence into behavioral economics can provide
clues that will help legal scholars not just understand human cognitions
more fully, but also help them conceptualize the law’s prescriptive response
to cognitive biases. After all, if cultural diversity can potentially solve
genetically caused challenges 115 , perhaps it can help solve behavioral ones.

115

See NATURE , supra note __.

